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I. INTRODUCTION
Popular consensus suggests that the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA)1 is a mess, and one of historic, if
not mythical, proportions. ERISA's comprehensive reach to
protect employer-provided benefits has in practice produced
unintended, if not contradictory, results. Legal scholars have
employed numerous colorful clich6s (some all but worn out) to
describe the Act: "a Serbonian bog ... from which there is no way
of extricating oneself";2 a "legal Scylla and Charybdis [that trap]
personal injury victims"; 3 a "Hobson's choice" between ERISA's
plain language and legislative intent;4 "a 'Catch 22' of conflicting
ERISA policies"; 5 a Gordian knot "of interlocking definitional
provisions" courts need to slice through;6 and, of course, a slippery
slope feared by business and labor interests opposed to ERISA
reform.7 Some of this hand wringing may be justified because
ERISA really is kind of a mess.8
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)). A quick note on reference to the
statutory language: the ERISA provisions pertinent to this article are codified in Title 29
of the United States Code-Labor. For ease of readability, reference to these sections will
be to the numbering scheme of the precodified Act. For example, section 502 is at 29
U.S.C. § 1132; section 514 of the Act appears at 29 U.S.C. § 1144.
2. Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How to Fix It:
Reinterpreting ER1SA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 534 & n.359 (2003) (quoting
DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J.,
concurring)) ("A Serbonian bog is a mess from which there is no way of extricating
oneself.").
3. David M. Kono, Note & Comment, Unraveling the Lining of ERISA Health
Insurer Pockets-A Vote for National Federal Common Law Adoption of the Make Whole
Doctrine, 2000 BYU L. REV. 427, 428 (2000). Scylla and Charybdis were two monsters
that Ulysses faced on his journey. See THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH'S MYTHOLOGY
244 (Avenel Books 1978) (describing Ulysses's encounter with the monsters).
4. Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How to Fix It:
Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 517 (2003).
5. Charles T. Caliendo, Jr., Note, Removing the "Natural Distaste" from the Mouth of
the Supreme Court with a Criminal Fraud Amendment to ERISA 's Anti-Alienation Rule, 68
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 667, 720 (1994).
6. Scott Kording, Note, Slicing Through the Gordian Knot: "Employers," Standing,
and Removal Under ERISA, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1257, 1257 (2005) (describing a Gordian
knot as "so complex that unraveling it was considered impossible").
7. Fernando R. Laguarda, Note, Federalism Myth: States as Laboratories of Health
Care Reform, 82 GEO. L.J. 159, 183 (1993).
8. Cf. Douglas J. Witten, Regulation of "Downstream" and Direct Risk Contracting
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Congress passed ERISA over thirty years ago as a national
measure to protect pensions. 9 That much is clear on the face of
the Act's title, which directly references "Employee Retirement
... Security"; 1  the title, however, fails to reveal the reach of
ERISA into employee benefits beyond pensions.11 Thus, the
uninitiated must first get past any confusion created by the title of
the Act to begin to appreciate all of the areas ERISA "messes"
with. Unfortunately, many in the legal profession have the
uninformed (but partly accurate) sense that ERISA is a mysterious
(that is the accurate part)12 and esoteric area of law that is not
likely to be confronted because pension litigation is outside one's
area of practice. The problem is that ERISA also regulates non-
pension plans, including the standard health insurance of millions
of workers and their dependents who are covered under employer-
provided plans.13  These benefits come under the "welfare
benefit" provisions of the Act.14 The Act elaborately defines
welfare benefit,' 5 and in essence, if an employer pays for
by Health Care Providers: The Quest for Consumer Protection and a Level Playing Field,
23 AM. J.L. & MED. 449, 467 n.161 (1997) (characterizing the regulatory environment for
health provider-sponsored organizations as "just kind of a mess").
9. See, e.g., Matthew 0. Gatewood, Note, The New Map: The Supreme Court's Guide
to Curing Thirty Years of Confusion in ERISA 's Savings Clause Analysis, 62 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 643, 647 (2005) (discussing the history of ERISA).
10. See Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (providing that the "Act may be cited as the
'Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974'").
11. Kelly M. Loud, Comment, ERISA Preemption and Patients' Rights in the Wake of
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1039, 1068 n.174 (2005) ("The long title
of ERISA as originally introduced in the Senate was 'To Strengthen and Improve the
Protection and Interests of Participants and Beneficiaries of Employee Pension and
Welfare Benefit Plans.'"); see also 119 CONG. REC. 130 (1973) (introducing the bill as "[a]
bill to strengthen and improve the protections and interests of participants and
beneficiaries of employee pension and welfare benefit plans").
12. See Cameron Krier, Comment, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Impact
of Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila on ERISA and Patients' Rights, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 127,
131 (2006) ("ERISA, notorious for its complexity and ambiguity, is a 700-page federal
statute with 3600 pages of published regulations.").
13. See, e.g., James W. Kim, Note, Managed Care Liability, ERISA Preemption, and
State "Right to Sue" Legislation in Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 36 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 651,
660 (2005) ("Over the years, the vast increase in health insurance coverage through
employment-based insurance has defined ERISA as a primary means of regulation for
health benefits for millions of Americans.").
14. If you are seeking scholarly treatment of ERISA pension matters, this article is
not for you.
15. ERISA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2000). Section 3 of ERISA provides:
(1) The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any plan,
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insurance to cover health care or provides other fringe benefits,
such as disability insurance, paid vacation, or even day care,
ERISA law comes into play. So, what does that mean?
What better place to find a legal problem vividly illustrated than
in a John Grisham story? One ERISA commentator has
succinctly summed up the plot of The Rainmaker:
16
A young man, Donny Ray, discovers that he has acute leukemia.
The insurance company refuses to qualify him for the only treatment
that would cure him, a bone marrow transplant .... As a result,
Donny Ray spends months [lying] in his own bed at home,
untreated, and finally dies from the disease, even though his family
had been dutifully paying his insurance premiums month after
month. The insurance company denies coverage for no legal reason:
the plan contract includes the procedure, but the company simply
refuses to pay the $175,000 that the treatment would cost, in the
hopes of making as much profit as possible. The company is playing
the odds that Donny Ray's family will not seek legal help. At trial,
the jury awards Donny Ray's family $50 million in punitive damages
for the company's bad faith, leading to a stream of other lawsuits
brought by other insureds and eventually driving the company out of
business. 17
The Rays bought the policy "from a door-to-door salesman."18
Were Grisham an ERISA specialist, he could have taken the story
in an entirely different direction by illustrating what would have
happened in court if Donny's insurance had been an employer-
provided plan. 19 ERISA would have preempted the claim, shut
fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by
an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan,
fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise,
(A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or
other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal
services, or (B) any benefit described in § 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947 (other than pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such
pensions).
16. JOHN GRISHAM, THE RAINMAKER (1995).
17. Stacy Rogers Sharp, Note, ERISA Preemption and MCO Liability: The Court's
Search in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila for Congress's Elusive Intent, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1347,
1347 (2006) (paraphrasing the storyline in John Grisham's novel and the movie The
Rainmaker).
18. Id. at 1348.
19. See id. at 1348 n.4 (pointing out that 88% of Americans get health care coverage
[Vol. 39:277
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off the $50 million in punitive damages, and confined equitable
relief to no more than the $175,000 that the covered medical
treatment would have cost in the first place.2 0  But there is a
reason the writer did not use an ERISA-driven plot in The
Rainmaker: it would have preempted the feel-good ending for the
novice lawyer who won the case and brought justice to a small part
of the world. Such happy judicial endings in real-life ERISA
litigation, however, are often enjoyed by health care corporations
and not the insured. Why? Because that is what Congress,
whether intentionally or not, hath wrought.
II. THE ERISA PREEMPTION SCHEME
Congress passed ERISA in 1974 to protect the rights of
employees who benefit from employer pension and welfare benefit
plans.21 It did so with a series of regulations that promote
uniformity in litigation across the various states through "strong
preemption language. ' '2 2 Legislative history of the Act indicates
that the "uniformity of decision which [ERISA] is designed to
foster will help administrators, fiduciaries and participants to
predict the legality of proposed actions without the necessity of
reference to varying state laws. ' 23
The goal of uniformity arguably benefits workers, in that the
imposition of regular standards of conduct may lend predictability
to the scope of litigation, or its venue, and lead to some
consistency in the process. But if uniform enforcement goes awry,
from work (citing Timothy S. Jost, Pegram v. Herdrich: The Supreme Court Confronts
Managed Care, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 187, 187 (2001))).
20. See id. at 1348 ("If Donny Ray were a patient in 2006 who had received his
coverage through his employee benefit plan, the company would have owed his family
only the cost of the bone marrow transplant and would profitably continue to deny
medically necessary coverage to patients whose plans promised it.").
21. See, e.g., Elizabeth Khoury, Comment, HMO Liability After Aetna Health Inc. v.
Davila: Are Patients' Rights at Risk, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1621, 1623 (2006) (stating one of the
purposes of ERISA that benefited employees). To help out employers, Congress
provided tax incentives. Leonard A. Nelson, Aetna v. Davila/Cigna v. Calad: A Missed
Opportunity, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 843,845-46 (2005).
22. Elizabeth Khoury, Comment, HMO Liability After Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila:
Are Patients' Rights at Risk?, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1621, 1623 (2006) (quoting Jeffrey W.
Stempel et al., Doctors, HMOs, ERISA, and the Public Interest After Pegram v. Herdrich,
36 TORT & INS. L.J. 687,698 (2001)).
23. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 12 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650.
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then the beneficiaries under that program may uniformly suffer.
Put another way, some claim that ERISA has not entirely lived up
to its initial purpose of providing workers a safety net.24 The so-
called safety net, in fact, has often become a barrier that fences off
plaintiffs from the possibility of make-whole relief on claims that
welfare benefits have been denied or mismanaged. ERISA's
preemption feature has produced the negative consequence of
changing what were meant to be benefits into barriers.2 5
Preemption, the mechanism in ERISA that herds claims into the
federal law corral-and sometimes exclusively into the federal
courthouse-drives much of the current angst that litigators,
especially plaintiffs' attorneys, experience. The preemption
doctrine itself is relatively straightforward. Congress, finding
authority in the Supremacy Clause, 26 has the power to invalidate
state laws that conflict with federal laws. But the application of
this doctrine to particular legislative language, i.e., ERISA's
"strong preemption language" referenced above,27 can get
messy.28
24. See, e.g., Cameron Krier, Comment, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The
Impact of Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila on ERISA and Patients' Rights, 38 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 127, 129 (2006) ("[N]ow HMOs have no incentive to provide adequate health care
coverage."); Scott Rhodes, Comment, ERISA Strikes Back: Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila's
Use of ERISA to Strike Down the Texas Healthcare Liability Act, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 481,
505 (2005) ("[T]he evolution of HMOs from fee-for-service to utilization review processes,
coupled with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the preemptive scope of ERISA and
remedies available therefrom, appears to leave plan beneficiaries inadequately protected
under federal law.").
25. Matthew 0. Gatewood, Note, The New Map: The Supreme Court's Guide to
Curing Thirty Years of Confusion in ERISA Savings Clause Analysis, 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 643, 647 (2005) ("In order to facilitate [uniformity], Congress designed ERISA to
preempt state laws governing employee benefits.").
26. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. (emphasis added).
27. Elizabeth Khoury, Comment, HMO Liability After Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila:
Are Patients' Rights at Risk?, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1621, 1623 (2006).
28. See, e.g., Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An
Empirical Study of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1604, 1606 (2007) (pointing out that the "relate to" language in ERISA
section 514 has uncertain meaning in different contexts).
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Although rigid in its terms, ERISA nonetheless gives plaintiffs
some litigation choices and defendants some defense options.
Sections 502 and 514 comprise the two components of the ERISA
preemption scheme. 2 9 Application of the scheme logically begins
with section 514(a), which provides that ERISA "shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate
to any employee benefit plan."'3 ° Courts give the "relate to" term
in this provision broad effect, 31 but what does that mean?3 2 The
court in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux3 3 tried to clarify the
phrase as follows:
In [two precedent cases], we noted the expansive sweep of the
preemption clause. In both cases "[t]he phrase 'relate to' was given
its broad common-sense meaning, such that a state law 'relate[s] to'
a benefit plan 'in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a
connection with or reference to such a plan.' 34
More helpful is the effort by the district court judge in Lippard
v. Unumprovident Corp. ,3 relying on New York State Conference
of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,36
who put into categories the areas in which state law claims
typically succumb to preemption:
Congress intended to preempt at least three categories of state law
under section 514: (1) laws that mandate employee benefit
structures or their administration, (2) laws that bind employers or
plan administrators to particular choices or preclude uniform
administrative practices, and (3) laws that provide alternative
enforcement mechanisms to ERISA's civil enforcement provisions
29. Elizabeth Khoury, Comment, HMO Liability After Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila:
Are Patients' Rights at Risk?, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1621, 1623 (2006) ("ERISA's preemptive
force is outlined in sections 502 and 514.").
30. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
31. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (explaining that case law
has given "relate to" a broad common-sense meaning).
32. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995) (holding that the Court resigned itself to the reality that it
"must go beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining [section
514(a)'s] key term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to
the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive").
33. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
34. Id. at 47 (citations omitted).
35. Lippard v. Unumprovident Corp., 261 F. Supp. 2d 368 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
36. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645 (1995).
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:277
[i.e., section 502]. 3 7
Looking at it another way, what is not preempted, under the
Travelers approach, are general health care laws that have
historically been the subject of local regulation.3 8 Additionally,
ERISA includes a savings clause at section 514(b)(2)(A) that saves
from preemption state laws that may regulate explicitly in the
areas of insurance, banking, or securities. 39
With these rules of the road in mind, a typical plaintiff who
seeks redress in state court for denial of benefits by a workplace
insurance provider, such as improper handling of an insurance
claim, and who files state statutory and common law claims,40
faces a section 514(a) roadblock because the defendant can raise
the defense that ERISA preempts the claim.4" To keep the action
alive in state court, the plaintiff would have to replead the claims
under the concurrent jurisdiction components of ERISA's civil
enforcement scheme 42 or face dismissal of the action for want of
jurisdiction due to ERISA preemption.4 3 Or, a plaintiff could
37. Lippard, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 374-75 (fashioning categories from the explanation
provided in N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645, 658-59 (1995)).
38. Cameron Krier, Comment, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Impact of
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila on ERISA and Patients' Rights, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 127,
135 (2006) (citing N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,661 (1995)).
39. See Kelly M. Loud, Comment, ERISA Preemption and Patients' Rights in the
Wake of Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1039, 1047-49 (2005) ("[W]hile
a state law that regulates an HMO may 'relate to' an employee benefit plan, the law may
also 'regulate insurance' and therefore may be saved from preemption.").
40. ERISA § 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (2000) ("The term 'State law' includes
all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any
State."). Typical claims against a health care plan provider might include breach of
contract, negligence, breach of the duty of good faith, or deceptive trade practices. Note
that each of these claims "relates to" conduct regarding the health care plan, and none of
the laws on which they are based fit into the savings clause because the laws do not directly
regulate insurance.
41. See Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1294 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Because of
the breadth of the preemption clause and the broad remedial purpose of ERISA, 'state
laws found to be beyond the scope of [section 514] are few."'(quoting Jackson v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 805 F.2d 1498, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986))).
42. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), (e), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (e) (2000) (granting
concurrent jurisdiction (1) to recover plan benefits, (2) to enforce plan rights, or (3) to
clarify rights to future benefits). The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over any
other ERISA claims besides these. Id. § 502(e).
43. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) (holding that federal law
preempts state law claims of improper processing of benefits under an ERISA plan);
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choose to stay clear of the state courts by filing in federal district
court to pursue ERISA-as opposed to state law-claims,4 4 which
would provide the limited individual equitable remedies available
under section 502(a)(3).
This brings us to the analysis of section 502, the civil enforce-
ment mechanism. Section 502(e)(1), which covers jurisdiction,
defines the claims that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts and those that can be filed in state courts with
concurrent jurisdiction.4 5  In a nutshell, "any state-law cause of
action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil
enforcement remedy"4 6 must be brought in federal court unless
the action-brought by an individual, for example (rather than a
state) 47 -is: (1) "to recover benefits ... under the terms of his
plan"; (2) "to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan"; or (3)
"to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan."'4 8  Put simply, if a plaintiff's claim falls within section
502(a)(1)(B), the plaintiff can shop forums and choose to file the
Gorman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 811 S.W.2d 542, 547, 549 (Tex. 1991) (holding that
claims for breach of fiduciary duty, punitive damages, and mental anguish under an
ERISA plan come outside of section 502(a)(1)(B) and are preempted).
44. See Kelly M. Loud, Comment, ERISA Preemption and Patients' Rights in the
Wake of Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1039, 1050 (2005) (discussing
that defendant would not be able to remove the state law action to federal court because,
under the well-pleaded complaint rule, section 514(a) presents only a federal defense, not
a basis for federal jurisdiction).
45. ERISA § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (2000). Section 502(e)(1) provides
that:
Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of [section 502], the district courts of
the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this title
brought by the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, [or] fiduciary .... State
courts of competent jurisdiction and district courts of the United States shall have
concurrent jurisdiction of actions under [subsection (A)(1)(B) of this section].
Id.
46. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004).
47. See ERISA § 502(a)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(7) (2000) (providing concurrent
jurisdiction to states "to enforce compliance with a qualified medical child support
order").
48. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000). If these look like
contract enforcement tools, do not be surprised to learn that the remedies available under
ERISA are equitable in nature, i.e., no tort or extra-contractual damages are awarded.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Khoury, Comment, HMO Liability After Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila:
Are Patients' Rights at Risk?, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1621, 1624 (2006) ("[A] plaintiff who is
wrongfully denied coverage for a hospital stay will be reimbursed for the cost of any care
wrongfully denied, but not for any consequences suffered due to such a denial.").
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action in either state or federal court.4 9
A claim subject to section 502(a)(1)(B)-even though not
labeled as such-and filed in state court is, of course, subject to
removal to federal court by the defendant.50 The Supreme Court
in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor51 explained some of
the removal niceties as they pertain to ERISA section 502
claims.52 Ordinarily, federal preemption is just a defense to a
claim and does not itself generate federal jurisdiction.53 This is
because the well-pleaded complaint rule requires that the basis for
jurisdiction appear on the face of the complaint 5a-and a defense
obviously cannot satisfy that requirement. In some instances,
however, congressional intent to completely preempt an area of
law is so manifest that a state law claim pled by a plaintiff changes
by operation of law to a federal claim.5 5 ERISA performs this
magic. 5 6 Thus, for section 502(a)(1)(B) claims-whether pursued
in state or federal court, and whether labeled as such or not-
federal ERISA law will control. For all the other section 502
claims, federal law controls and the claims must be heard
exclusively in federal court.
Sections 514 and 502 do not work as a seamless web. For
instance, a claim that sidesteps a section 514(a) challenge because
it does not relate to 57 the employee's benefit plan (e.g., it may be
excepted from preemption under the section 514(b)(2)(A) savings
49. Cf. Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) ("[T]he party who
brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon.").
50. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000).
51. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
52. Id. at 63.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 64-66. This is known as the complete preemption doctrine. See, e.g.,
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1983) (discussing
the power of the preemptive force, in that "if a federal cause of action completely
preempts a state cause of action any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal
cause of action necessarily 'arises under' federal law," even if a plaintiff pleads only a state
cause of action).
56. See ERISA § 502(f), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(f) (2000) ("The district courts of the United
States shall have jurisdiction, without respect to the amount in controversy or the
citizenship of the parties, to grant the relief provided for in subsection (a) of this section in
any action.").
57. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (2000) ("[ERISA] shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan.").
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clause) will not survive section 502(a) preemption if it seeks
benefits outside of ERISA's exclusive remedies.58
So what's the problem? Can't a plaintiff file suit in federal
court-thus avoiding the hassles of getting removed-and seek the
remedies available under ERISA? One commentator lays out the
stark reality of the restricted payoff in such a suit:
Once complete preemption is implicated in a benefits-coverage
issue, section 502(a) provides for an exclusive federal remedy. The
remedy allows the [insured] two options: (1) an injunction to stop
the [insurer] from wrongfully denying benefits; and (2) "other
appropriate equitable relief." Under the "equitable remedy,"
persons affected by wrongful denials may receive the benefit that
the [insurer] wrongfully denied under the plan, but they may not
receive damages for the injuries suffered. The courts have further
interpreted ERISA's "equitable relief" provision to prevent [an
insured] from obtaining "make-whole relief." Make-whole relief
includes expenses that [an insured] may have incurred due to the
wrongful denial of benefits, such as physical harm or suffering.59
Another author, speaking in the role of an HMO, summed up
the prospects of limited damages in ERISA actions somewhat
more cynically: "So what if we deny the benefit to this patient, the
worst that can happen is they file suit and a court makes us pay it
later."6 0
58. See Kelly M. Loud, Comment, ERISA Preemption and Patients' Rights in the
Wake of Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1039, 1049 (2005) (explaining
ERISA preemption). Loud states:
Though section 514 serves to preempt all laws that "relate to" an employee benefit
plan, the civil enforcement provisions of section 502(a) carry an even stronger
preemptive power. An action brought pursuant to a state law that provides remedies
in excess of those provided for in section 502(a), or an action brought under a state
law that could have been brought under section 502(a) will not be saved by section
514(b)(2)(A), regardless of its relation to insurance.
Id.
59. Elizabeth Khoury, Comment, HMO Liability After Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila:
Are Patients' Rights at Risk?, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1621, 1631 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
60. Cameron Krier, Comment, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Impact of
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila on ERISA and Patients' Rights, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 127,
129 (2006) (quoting Theodore W. Ruger, The United State Supreme Court and Health
Law: The Year in Review, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 528, 529-30 (2004)). ERISA scholars
have lamented that the equitable remedies available under the Act have not only limited
the availability of monetary relief, they may also have contributed to diminished levels of
medical care. See, e.g., Elizabeth Khoury, Comment, HMO Liability After Aetna Health
Inc. v. Davila: Are Patients' Rights at Risk?, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1621, 1644 (2006) ("In fact,
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ERISA sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3) list the six-and
only six-types of relief available to successful plaintiffs, all of
which are equitable. The provisions are succinctly listed and
summed up, as follows:
Under ERISA section 502(a), a participant or beneficiary may (i)
recover benefits due under an ERISA plan; (ii) enforce rights under
the terms of an ERISA plan; (iii) clarify rights to future benefits; (iv)
seek redress on behalf of the plan for losses as a result of a breach of
fiduciary duty; (v) enjoin acts violating ERISA or the plan; and (vi)
obtain equitable relief to redress violation of the plan or enforce the
terms of the plan. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Pilot Life:
"The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies
and exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be
completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and
beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that
Congress rejected in ERISA." This principle is applied, regardless
of whether the effect of preemption will leave the plaintiff without a
remedy.6 1
Try as they might, plaintiffs' attorneys have been unsuccessful in
spinning this equitable straw into gold. That battle was waged
long ago in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,62
where the Court considered ERISA's "voluminous legislative
history," and noted that congressional committee reports
contemplated "the full range of legal and equitable [relief]" as
ERISA remedies, but by the time the bill came out of the
conference committee "the reference to legal relief was
deleted."' 63 Until Congress says otherwise, litigants can rely only
on equitable options for relief.64
From a plaintiff's perspective, money damages can, of course,
make a lawsuit more worthwhile than one that offers injunctive
because HMOs need not fear tort damages for wrongful denials of care, HMOs might
have more of an incentive to provide less coverage for care.").
61. Gary S. Pancer et al., Recent Developments in Medicine and Law, 40 TORT TRIAL
& INS. PRAC. L.J. 677, 686-87 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
62. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
63. Id. at 145-46 ("The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in
[section] 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted ... provide strong evidence that Congress
did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.").
64. See Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (choosing not to
deviate from the "comprehensive legislative scheme" set forth in Russell, which found
only equitable remedies available as part of ERISA enforcement).
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relief alone. And, to state the obvious, the prospect of money
damages makes litigation economically feasible. Congress,
however, bargained this chip away in balancing the interests of
insureds' claim settlement procedures with the public's interest in
having employers provide workers' benefits.65
III. EVOLUTION OF ERISA IN THE COURTS
Courts have worked for decades to map out, or find detours
around, the various preemption hazards faced in ERISA litigation
over welfare benefits. This has largely been a struggle to mesh
judicial interpretation of congressional intent with plaintiffs'
expectations, or at least hopes, of receiving make-whole relief.
Numerous law review articles trace that history 66-a tale that
65. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (describing the
balancing approach between civil enforcement and public policy). The Pilot Life opinion
reads:
[T]he detailed provisions of [section] 502(a) set forth a comprehensive civil
enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt and
fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the
formation of employee benefit plans. The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of
certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be
completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to
obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA.
Id. While much of the scholarly literature focuses on the plight of the plaintiff to secure
make-whole relief (including the instant article), the business interests that safeguard the
general availability of employer-provided benefits should not be overlooked. Christopher
F. Robertson, Note, Closing the Massachusetts Mutual v. Russell Gap: Monetary Damage
Awards Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 691, 721 (1991).
The availability of extracontractual compensatory or punitive damages under
ERISA could have a significant impact on both the cost and availability of pension
plans. Extracontractual damage awards could undermine the statute because a
principle purpose of the statute is to continue to allow pension systems to be cost
effective.... If court costs and damage awards exceed the benefit that employers
receive from the government in the form of favorable tax treatment, employers, due
to the prohibitive costs, may no longer provide employee benefit plans.
Id. (footnote omitted).
66. See, e.g., Matthew 0. Gatewood, Note, The New Map: The Supreme Court's
Guide to Curing Thirty Years of Confusion in ERISA's Savings Clause Analysis, 62 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 643, 649 (2005) ("[T]here was 'no indication in the legislative history that
Congress was aware of the new prominence given the saving[s] clause in light of the
rewritten pre-emption clause."' (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 745
(1985))); see also Scott Rhodes, Comment, ERISA Strikes Back: Aetna Health, Inc. v.
Davila's Use of ERISA to Strike Down the Texas Healthcare Liability Act, 57 BAYLOR L.
REV. 481, 486 (2005) ("As the Supreme Court has addressed the issues of preemption and
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leads to the recent case of Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila.67
The Davila opinion (a relatively painless read for an ERISA
case) is a good starting place for the reader who seeks an
introduction to, and working familiarity with, the current perils of
preemption. The case turns on the medical misfortunes of two
insureds from Texas: Juan Davila and Ruby Calad.6 8 Each had
employer-provided health care coverage plans, which ERISA
regulates.6 9 Mr. Davila alleged that his insurer refused to pay for
arthritis medication prescribed by his doctor.70 Ms. Calad alleged
that her carrier should not have limited her hospital stay to one
day following a hysterectomy when her physician recommended a
longer stay.7 1 In both instances, counsel for the individuals
brought suit in Texas state court-not under ERISA, of course-
but for violations of the Texas Health Care Liability Act
(THCLA).7 2 The charge: tortious "failures to exercise ordinary
care in the handling of coverage decisions, in violation of a duty
imposed by the [THCLA]. '7 3  Counsel for Davila and Calad
transparently engaged in what some call "artful pleading" to avoid
removal, for which the courts have fashioned the artful pleading
doctrine. This "allows removal where federal law completely
preempts an asserted state-law claim, for a claim of that
preempted character is... from its inception, a claim that can arise
only under federal, not state, law."7 4  Defendant HMOs
predictably removed the cases to the federal courts, which denied
remedies, the lower courts have shown increasing frustration in trying to reconcile the
Court's precedent with Congress's intent."); Stacy Rogers Sharp, Note, ERISA
Preemption and MCO Liability: The Court's Search in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila for
Congress's Elusive Intent, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1358 (2006) (explaining that past Court
decisions regarding claims by the injured against MCOs have been inconsistent).
67. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
68. See Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2002) (consolidating
multiple actions for consideration of common ERISA issues).
69. Davila, 542 U.S. at 204.
70. Davila v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., No. 4:00-CV-1855-Y, 2001 WL 34354948,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 29, 2001).
71. Calad v. Cigna Healthcare of Tex., Inc., No. 3:00-CV-2693-H, 2001 WL 705776, at
*3 (N.D. Tex. June 21,2001).
72. Davila, 542 U.S. at 204 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.001-
.003 (Vernon Supp. 2004)).
73. Id.
74. Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 471 (1998) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). This doctrine is a perfect fit with ERISA section 502(a) claims.
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both plaintiffs' motions to remand the causes back to state court.7 5
Both the Davila and Calad trial courts also granted motions to
dismiss the actions with prejudice, on grounds that plaintiffs
showed no inclination to replead the claims under the rules of the
game imposed by ERISA.76 The parties appealed to the Fifth
Circuit, got the dismissals reversed,77 but ended up at the United
States Supreme Court on petition from the health care
companies.78
The narrow legal issue in the consolidated cases (put in context
of the preemption controversy) is whether ERISA completely
preempted the state-law tort claims (that could have reaped
money damages) and made the actions removable to federal court,
which required that the claims be recast under ERISA for
equitable relief only-with little or no cash rewards available.7 9
Davila and Calad both lost.80
In its analysis, the Court went through a standard "well-pleaded
complaint" inquiry8 1 and found the federal question of jurisdiction
under the exception that comes into play when comprehensive
federal legislation has completely displaced state law. 82  In
contrast, the Fifth Circuit held that the tort claims brought under
the THCLA for negligent care8 3 did "not duplicate the causes of
action listed in ERISA section 502(a)"' 84 and thus, the claims were
75. Davila, 2001 WL 34354948, at *3; Calad, 2001 WL 705776, at *6.
76. Davila, 2001 WL 34354948, at *3; Calad, 2001 WL 705776, at *6.
77. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 315 (5th Cir. 2002).
78. Davila, 542 U.S. at 200.
79. Id. at 204.
80. Id. at 221.
81. Id. at 207, 211-14; see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64
(1987) (discussing federal preemption as an affirmative defense). The Metropolitan Life
case states:
Federal pre-emption is ordinarily a federal defense to the plaintiff's suit.... [I]t
does not appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint, and, therefore, does not
authorize removal to federal court. One corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule
developed in the case law, however, is that Congress may so completely pre-empt a
particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily
federal in character.
Id. at 63-64 (citation omitted).
82. Davila, 542 U.S. at 207-09.
83. See Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: State Regulation of Insured Plans After Davila, 38
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 693, 711 (2005) ("The targets of the Texas statute are entities that
make medical judgments in the context of insurance coverage determinations.").
84. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 310-11 (5th Cir. 2002).
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not preempted. The Supreme Court saw ERISA preemption in
much broader terms than merely what remedies may or may not
be duplicated when comparing ERISA's equitable relief with
measures offered by other statutes that give patients heavier
artillery to go after managed care organizations for failure to
exercise ordinary care. That is, Davila did not focus on the failure
of the managed care entity in the exercise of due care in treatment
(as does the THCLA); rather, it looked to the alleged failures in
administration of the relevant health care plan to cover requested
treatment.8 5 The Court said:
[A] managed care entity could not be subject to liability under the
THCLA if it denied coverage for any treatment not covered by the
health care plan that it was administering.
Thus, interpretation of the terms of respondents' benefit plans
forms an essential part of their THCLA claim, and THCLA liability
would exist here only because of petitioners' administration of
ERISA-regulated benefit plans.8 6
The take-home message from Davila, then, is that if an insured
seeks recovery from the benefits provider for problems in
treatment-as Davila and Calad did in alleging their HMOs
"controlled, influenced, participated in and made decisions which
affected the quality of the diagnosis, care, and treatment
provided" 87-the duty owed can ultimately be traced back to the
benefits promised under the plan.8 8 And if it is an ERISA-
regulated plan, the claims will be preempted and limited to
ERISA's limited equitable remedies.8 9 In that event, the state
causes of action come within section 502(a) and are completely
preempted. 90
This spells bad news for plaintiffs. One author summed up the
Davila holding, as follows:
85. Davila, 542 U.S. at 212-13.
86. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 213 (2004).
87. Id. at 212 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Appx. H at 69a, Davila, 542
U.S. 200 (No. 02-1845)).
88. See id. at 214 ("Hence, respondents bring suit only to rectify a wrongful denial of
benefits promised under ERISA-regulated plans, and do not attempt to remedy any
violation of a legal duty independent of ERISA.").
89. See id. at 215-16 (highlighting preemption of state cause of action when equitable
remedy was converted into a legal remedy).
90. See id. at 215-16, 221 (holding that ERISA section 502(a) remedies preempt state
causes of action).
[Vol. 39:277
2007] ERISA PREEMPTION AND ALTERNATIVE SCHEMES 293
The Court's decision in Davila is appropriate only in the sense
that it closely follows precedent. Yet, the implications of the
decision are troubling. There is no check on the HMO's decision to
deny care. Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, stressed that the
plaintiffs only complained of denials of coverage that were provided
under their health insurance plans. Accordingly, Justice Thomas
noted that Davila and Calad "could have paid for the treatment
themselves and then sought reimbursement through a section
502(a)(1)(B) action, or sought a preliminary injunction." However,
Justice Thomas offered an unreasonable alternative for patients to
pursue. ERISA's purpose was to provide a "uniform regulatory
regime," not to deprive patients of their right to receive proper
medical care. The Court's logic defeats the purpose of ERISA, to
protect workers' rights. In essence, patients must provide their own
benefits and hope that one day, after an intense appeals process,
they will be reimbursed. 9 1
In dicta, the Davila Court readily dismissed any notion that
because the THCLA regulates insurance, the section 514(b)(2)(A)
savings clause 92  would allow plaintiffs a way around
preemption. 93  The Court reiterated that "ERISA [section]
514(b)(2)(A) must be interpreted in light of the congressional
intent to create an exclusive federal remedy in ERISA [section]
502(a)." 94 One author has questioned the reasoning of Davila in
dismissing the savings clause argument so easily with regard to the
THCLA-which regulates insurance 95-by pointing out that the
91. Elizabeth Khoury, Comment, HMO Liability After Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila:
Are Patients' Rights at Risk?, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1621, 1642-43 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
92. See Kelly M. Loud, Comment, ERISA Preemption and Patients' Rights in the
Wake of Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1039, 1049 (2005) (discussing
the ERISA savings clause).
93. Davila, 542 U.S. at 216-18.
94. Id. at 217.
95. See Leonard A. Nelson, Aetna v. Davila/Cigna v. Calad A Missed Opportunity,
31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 843, 874-75 (2005) (noting that THCLA regulates insurance).
Nelson writes:
In KAHP, the Court held that a state law regulates insurance if (1) it is specifically
directed toward entities engaged in insurance and (2) it "substantially affect[s] the
risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured." THCLA section
88.002(a) imposes liability against "[a] health insurance carrier, health maintenance
organization, or other managed care entity." In Rush Prudential, the Court held that
an HMO is an insurer for insurance savings clause purposes. Therefore, THCLA
should satisfy the first KAHP requirement. THCLA almost certainly meets the
second KAHP requirement as well because THCLA mandates that managed care
entities, rather than insureds, must incur the tort damages that ensue from insurers'
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precedent relied on in Pilot Life did not concern a state law that
regulated insurance.96
IV. GLIMMERS OF HOPE FOR PLAINTIFFS
Post-Davila, are plaintiffs insured through work doomed never
to collect money damages for a negligent health care decision that
has ERISA fingerprints on it? Not necessarily.
In Texas, two notable cases have entered the fray, sidestepping
the result reached in Davila. The first is Stiles v. Memorial
Hermann Healthcare System,9 7 a case brought by hospital
employee Mattie Stiles after she was injured on the job.98  She
alleged that she entered into a "Release of Claims and Covenant
Not to Sue" with the hospital (Memorial), so long as it would pay
her medical expenses. 99 Stiles claimed Memorial refused to pay,
and she sued in state court for breach of contract and fraud.10 0
There is no question that the release specifically made reference
to Memorial's Occupational Health Plan in terms of Stiles
agreeing that "any claim I may have for benefits under the Plan is
not affected by this Release."'' There it is, right there in bold type
in the previous sentence: ERISA fingerprints. Any defense
counsel would deny the claim, argue lack of jurisdiction by the
state court, and file to remove the matter to federal court. 10 2 And
failure to exercise ordinary care when making health care treatment decisions.
Because the statute shifts this risk between the parties, THCLA should fall within the
KAHP criteria for the insurance savings clause.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
96. Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: State Regulation of Insured Plans After Davila, 38 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 693,717 n.110 (2005) ("Recall that the Pilot Life Court ruled that the
state law at issue in that case was not a law that regulates insurance; consequently, the
Davila Court's heavy reliance on Pilot Life is particularly misplaced.").
97. Stiles v. Mem'l Hermann Healthcare Sys., 213 S.W.3d 521 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2001, pet. filed).
98. Id. at 524. As of the date of this article, the Texas Supreme Court has yet to rule
on the petition for review.
99. Id. at 524-25.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 525, 529.
102. Whether the state court had subject matter jurisdiction is a thorny matter that
involves inquiry into complete preemption versus ordinary or conflict preemption, and the
matter of concurrent jurisdiction. See Stiles, 213 S.W.3d at 527 & n.3 (recognizing the
intricacies of preemption and removal). Counsel for Memorial later backed off of the
jurisdictional defense.
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that is exactly what counsel for Memorial did.10 3 Stiles requested
that the federal trial court remand the matter back to Texas state
court, which it did, citing lack of federal jurisdiction because
"'substantial doubt remains as to whether [Stiles's] claim does in
fact fall within the preemptive scope of ERISA."' 4  Meanwhile,
back in state court, the judge granted Memorial's motion to
dismiss the suit, "concluding that Stiles's state law claims for
breach of contract and fraud were 'addressed by' and 'related
to '10 5 the Plan, that ERISA 'completely preempted' Stiles's state
law claims, and that it had no subject matter jurisdiction over the
claims."'10 6
Stiles appealed to the First Court of Appeals in Houston, which
rejected the trial court's ERISA preemption argument. 107 While
acknowledging Davila's mandate that the "ERISA preemptive
provision is to be broadly construed,"' 1 8 the Texas appellate court
nonetheless found the claim for breach of contract and fraud,
based on allegations of noncompliance with the terms of the
release, too tenuous to constitute an ERISA claim:
Here, the release reflects that Stiles bargained for a distinct and
independent promise from Memorial to pay her medical bills in
consideration of her release of any claims against Memorial arising
from the incident. We conclude that the underlying conduct
complained about in this case, breach of contract and fraud, can be
"divorced from its connection to the employee benefit plan."'10 9
It must first be noted that Memorial's arguments on rehearing are distinct from the
arguments it made in its original briefing. In its original briefing, Memorial argued
that because Stiles sought a remedy to which she was not entitled, her claims were
"completely preempted" and, as a result, the trial court "lacked subject matter
jurisdiction." Memorial now concedes on rehearing that the trial court did not lack
jurisdiction and asserts, for the first time, that "the correct outcome in this appeal is a
remand to the trial court for adjudication of Stiles's state law complaints re-
characterized as claims for benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
Id. at 529.
103. Id. at 525.
104. Id.
105. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) ("[T]he provisions of [ERISA]
shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan ... ").
106. Stiles, 213 S.W.3d at 525.
107. Stiles v. Mem'l Hermann Healthcare Sys., 213 S.W.3d 521, 532-33 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. filed).
108. Id. at 526.
109. Id. at 532 (quoting Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776, 783 (5th Cir.
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Chalk one up for the Stiles plaintiff. Sections 502 and 514, the
Scylla and Charybdis of ERISA preemption, were avoided.
A more intriguing post-Davila1t 0 case is Smelik v. Mann.1 '
The basics of the case are succinctly summed up as follows:
In Smelik v. Mann, the plaintiff sued his wife's physicians and HMO
under the Texas HMO Act, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, and the Texas Insurance Code after she died from problems
associated with kidney failure. The plaintiff argued that Humana,
the HMO, breached its nondelegable duty to supervise the quality of
care provided to his wife. More specifically, the plaintiff claimed
that Humana did not properly inform his wife of her diagnosis and
treatment options, furnish access to appropriate tests, provide a
physician who specialized in kidney disease, or supply the proper
Humana disease management programs her condition warranted.
The district court awarded $9 million in total damages of which
Humana was responsible for $4.2 million. The jury determined
Humana was thirty-five percent negligent, placing the remaining
sixty-five percent of liability on the physicians and physicians' group.
Jon Powell, an attorney for the plaintiff, distinguished the issue
presented to the court in Smelik from Davila by asserting, "'This
[was] not a denial-of-benefits case. This [was] a mismanagement-of-
managed care [case].' In Smelik, the plaintiff did not allege that
Humana failed to pay for his wife's medical treatment, but instead
argued the Humana was negligent in the coordination and
supervision of her care. This type of argument protected the case
from ERISA preemption and the Supreme Court's holding in
Davila.1 12
This is one perspective, but the case has a few twists to it.
1994)).
110. While the Smelik case commenced in 2003 prior to the issuance of the 2004
Davila opinion, the parties cite Davila in their post-trial briefing on ERISA preemption
issues.
111. Smelik v. Mann, No. 2003-CI-06936 (57th Dist. Ct., Bexar County, Tex. July 27,
2005); see also Humana Health Plans of Tex., Inc., v. Smelik, No. 04-05-00738-CV, 2006
WL 467987 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 1, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (granting joint motion to settle case); In re Humana Health Plan of Tex., Inc.,
No. 04-05-00382-CV, 2005 WL 1629924 (Tex. App.-San Antonio July 13, 2005) (orig.
proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (granting mandamus relief from
trial court's granting of a motion to compel discovery of documents).
112. Cameron Krier, Comment, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Impact of
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila on ERISA and Patients' Rights, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 127,
151-52 (2006) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
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Joan Smelik benefited from an ERISA-regulated health plan
through her husband's employer. 1 3  Humana Health Plans of
Texas administered the plan under which Smelik received covered
kidney treatment." 4  When she died from renal failure, Smelik's
husband and adult children brought suit against Humana and
various treating physicians along with their medical groups.1" 5 In
their petition, they alleged various state law claims including
wrongful death, negligence, gross negligence, fraud, and violations
of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the Texas HMO Act,
and the Texas Insurance Code. 1 6  Significantly, the Smeliks
alleged "in the alternative only" ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B)
claims." 7 Some might call this artful pleading." 8
Inexplicably, counsel for Humana did not raise an ERISA
defense in their answer to the petition."19 Humana waited until
after it suffered a $4.2 million jury verdict12 0 to float an ERISA
defense in a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV)
motion. The motion made the bold assertion that "[p]laintiffs'
claims obviously 'relate to 1 2 ' an ERISA plan.' 2 2  From this
113. See Motion to Disregard Jury Findings & for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict Based on ERISA Preemption at 2, Smelik v. Mann, No. 2003-CI-06936 (57th Dist.
Ct., Bexar County, Tex. July 27, 2005) ("Joan Smelik was a beneficiary under her
husband's employer-furnished health care plan administered by Humana, a health
maintenance organization.").
114. See Plaintiffs' Second Amended Original Petition at 13, Smelik v. Mann, No.
2003-CI-06936 (57th Dist. Ct., Bexar County, Tex. July 27, 2005) (alleging that Humana
made representations that it would provide adequate medical care to plan members).
115. Id. at 2.
116. See generally Plaintiffs' Second Amended Original Petition, Smelik v. Mann, No.
2003-CI-06936 (57th Dist. Ct., Bexar County, Tex. July 27, 2005) (asserting several state
law claims).
117. Id. at 23.
118. See, e.g., James W. Kim, Note, Managed Care Liability, ERISA Preemption, and
State "Right to Sue" Legislation in Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 651,
673 n.146 (2005) ("[W]e must scrutinize the complaint for 'artful pleading,' and then refer
to section 502(a) itself and determine whether the actual alleged wrongdoing underlying
the cause of action could have formed the basis of a suit under that section."). The fact
that plaintiffs pleaded ERISA in the alternative should have been a strong hint to
defendants of an available preemption defense.
119. Motion to Disregard Jury Findings & for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
Based on ERISA Preemption at 5, Smelik v. Mann, No. 2003-CI-06936 (57th Dist. Ct.,
Bexar County, Tex. May 27, 2005) ("In its answer, Humana did not plead ERISA
preemption.").
120. See Final Judgment at 4-5, Smelik v. Mann, No. 2003-CI-06936 (224th Dist. Ct.,
Bexar County, Tex. July 27, 2005) (awarding $4.2 million in damages).
121. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (stating that ERISA supersedes
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point of departure, Humana argued that the case was ERISA
preempted 12 3 and jurisdictionally barred for lack of state court
subject matter jurisdiction. 124  Humana looked to Davila as
authority, noting the similarities between plaintiff Smelik's claims
and those in Davila where "ERISA plan participants and
beneficiaries sued their health maintenance organizations for
violating the Texas HMO Act by failing to exercise ordinary
care."
1 2 5
As an initial proposition, common sense suggests that a trial
judge will be skeptical of a claim that the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction if that claim is raised for the first time after a
jury trial has concluded. Litigation, however, is an unpredictable
competition that unfolds over time and develops as adversaries act
and react in different ways to their opponents' theories of the case.
Indeed, one of Humana's trial attorneys was also counsel in the
companion case to Davila .126 Given that the plaintiffs in Smelik
and Davila ultimately had opposite outcomes from their litigation,
it is apparent that strategies successfully put into play in one case
may fall short in another.
Plaintiffs' response to the JNOV motion was anything but a
surrender to the weighty Davila precedent relied on by Humana.
The response challenged Humana to pinpoint precisely what
specific ERISA section supports the JNOV motion.12 7 Only four
options, plaintiffs argued, are possible: (1) the claims fall outside of
ERISA; (2) the claims fall within section 502(a)(1)(B); (3) the
claims fall within section 514; or (4) the claims fall within section
502(a)(2)-(a) (9).121 Plaintiffs contended that Humana's JNOV
motion must fail under the first three options, and that the fourth
state laws insofar as they "relate to any employee benefit plan").
122. Motion to Disregard Jury Findings & for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
Based on ERISA Preemption at 1, Smelik v. Mann, No. 2003-CI-06936 (57th Dist. Ct.,
Bexar County, Tex. May 27,2005).
123. Id. at 5.
124. Id. at 10.
125. Id. at 6.
126. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Humana Health Plan of Texas, Inc.'s Motion
to Disregard Jury Findings & for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict Based on ERISA
Preemption at 10, Smelik v. Mann, No. 2003-CI-06936 (57th Dist. Ct., Bexar County, Tex.
May 27, 2005).
127. Id. at 1-2.
128. Id. at 2.
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option could not be proven. 129  Turning the artful pleading
doctrine on its head,' 30 they also charged in their response that
Humana's JNOV motion artfully attempted to plead its way
around specifying what particular provisions of ERISA section
502(a)(2)-(a)(9) would have given the federal courts exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction in this matter.13 1 To prove the point,
plaintiffs endeavored to "deconstruct" Humana's ERISA defense,
raised for the first time on appeal.1 3 2
The Smeliks' argument is simple but effective-traits not often
seen in ERISA litigation. If, under option one, the claims fall
outside of ERISA, the absence of preemption proves itself and the
state law causes of action proceed as in a typical civil action.
Under option two, even if the claims fall within section
502(a)(1)(B), a preemption defense fails under the procedural
posture of this case because Humana did not plead preemption as
an affirmative defense, so it was waived. A jurisdictional defense
is not available because section 502(a)(1)(B) does not strip a state
court of jurisdiction; rather, it offers choice-of-law preemption to
the defendant who wishes to remove the case to federal court-a
path Humana chose not to take.1 33 Turning to option three,
section 514 is a defensive tool, and one that, again, Humana chose
not to use in its pleadings responding to Plaintiffs' complaint.
Because it does not provide the federal courts with jurisdiction, its
129. Id.
130. See Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 471 (1998) (discussing artful
pleading).
131. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Humana Health Plan of Texas. Inc.'s Motion
to Disregard Jury Findings & for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict Based on ERISA
Preemption at 2, Smelik v. Mann, No. 2003-CI-06936 (57th Dist. Ct., Bexar County, Tex.
May 27, 2005).
132. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs' counsel's notion of "deconstruction" is not so much in the
sense of the Jacques Derrida philosophy that challenges the concept of uniformity in the
meaning of language; rather, the term is used more to describe the way a contractor would
demolish a building.
133. See Gorman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 811 S.W.2d 542, 546 (Tex. 1991) (holding
that ERISA's preemptive effect is an affirmative defense which may be waived).
A number of federal courts have held that ERISA preemption, when it operates to
displace state law in favor of federal law, is waived if not timely asserted as an
affirmative defense. We are in accord and hold that, where ERISA's preemptive
effect would result only in a change of the applicable law, preemption is an
affirmative defense which must be set forth in the defendant's answer or it is waived.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
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force, according to Plaintiffs, is "irrelevant" at the post-trial
stage.' 3 4 The question of relevance aside, it is hard to give a
defendant the benefit of a "waivable" defense that was not
pleaded.
For complete preemption that can be raised at any time,
Plaintiffs pointed Humana to the fourth and last option, proof of
one of the provisions of section 502(a)(2)-(9)-none of which,
according to Plaintiffs, could be proven in this action.1 35  The
causes of action contemplated by these provisions include (a)(2)
breach of fiduciary duty, (a)(3) claims for equitable relief, (a)(4)
relief for improper filing of tax information, (a)(5) claims of
equitable relief by the Secretary of Labor, (a)(6) collection of civil
penalties by the Secretary of Labor, (a)(7) enforcement of child
support by the State, (a)(8) suits by an employer or the Secretary
of Labor based on disclosure and reporting requirements, and
(a)(9) action for breach of fiduciary duty in the purchase of
insurance contracts or annuities. 136
The provision from this list that could have borne fruit for
Humana is section 502(a)(2), the breach of fiduciary duty
provision. Plaintiffs urged in their response that no such breach
was pled because no "plan administrator, in breach of his or her
fiduciary duties, stole money from the plan and went to Las Vegas
and lost it at the gaming tables." '1 37 This attempt to so categorize
a section 502(a)(2) claim may have elevated absurdity over
substance, but the trial court apparently considered the point in a
favorable light. Counsel for Humana might have been well
advised to develop the argument that Davila casts the role of an
ERISA fiduciary in the traditional context as an administrator and
decision maker under the plan-a broader role than someone who
134. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Humana Health Plan of Texas, Inc.'s Motion
to Disregard Jury Findings & for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict Based on ERISA
Preemption at 23, Smelik v. Mann, No. 2003-CI-06936 (57th Dist.Ct., Bexar County, Tex.
May 27, 2005).
135. Id. at 13-15.
136. See ERISA § 502(a)(2)-(9), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)-(9) (2000) (listing the parties
who have standing to bring a suit under the statute).
137. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Humana Health Plan of Texas, Inc.'s Motion
to Disregard Jury Findings & for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict Based on ERISA
Preemption at 15, Smelik v. Mann, No. 2003-CI-06936 (57th Dist. Ct., Bexar County, Tex.
May 27, 2005).
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holds onto the purse strings. 13 8
In a lackluster reply to plaintiffs' response, Humana dodged any
specific discussion on the waiver question and reasserted in
general terms that sections 514 and 502(a) have "powerful
preemptive force." '13 9 Humana only briefly touched on the
fiduciary duty provision of section 502(a)(2) and quoted key
language from Davila that "benefits determinations involving
medical judgments are, just as much as any other benefits
determinations, actions by plan fiduciaries.' 40  The extent of the
argument was that Humana agents were not treating physicians
who could be held vicariously liable (indicating that they must be
fiduciaries); "[t]herefore, [p]laintiffs could have brought a claim
under section 502(a)(2) for breach of fiduciary duty."'14 1 The trial
court did not buy it. The judge denied the JNOV motion in a form
order with no analysis.14 2
Therefore, the message from Smelik is not that it is a
breakthrough precedent for ERISA plaintiffs, as one hopeful
commentator believes. 143  Procedurally, the case lacks
138. See Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 220 (2004) (discussing the
attributes of plan fiduciaries under ERISA).
139. Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Humana Health Plan of
Texas, Inc.'s Motion to Disregard Jury Findings & for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict Based on ERISA Preemption at 1, Smelik v. Mann, No. 2003-CI-06936 (57th Dist.
Ct., Bexar County, Tex. May 27, 2005).
140. Davila, 542 U.S. at 220.
141. Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Humana Health Plan of
Texas, Inc.'s Motion to Disregard Jury Findings & for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict Based on ERISA Preemption at 5, Smelik v. Mann, No. 2003-CI-06936 (57th Dist.
Ct., Bexar County, Tex. May 27, 2005).
142. Order Denying Defendant Humana Health Plan of Texas, Inc.'s Motion to
Disregard Jury Findings & for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict Based on ERISA
Preemption at 1, Smelik v. Mann, No. 2003-CI-06936 (224th Dist. Ct., Bexar County, Tex.
Oct. 7, 2005).
143. Cameron Krier, Comment. One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Impact of
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila on ERISA and Patients' Rights, 38 TEx. TECH L. REV. 127,
152 (2006). The author writes:
Smelik is groundbreaking because it shows that HMOs will not be protected by
ERISA in all circumstances. But there are many who believe Smelik will not stand
after review by an appellate court. Charles Rhodes, a professor at South Texas
College of Law, stated, "'If all you have to do is prove negligence and you are around
ERISA, then the Supreme Court's opinion in Davila doesn't mean anything."'
Rhodes further added, "'In the end, this is just too easy a way to circumvent the
Supreme Court's decision in Davila by simply saying it's a negligence claim, and it's
not based on a denial of coverage."' Even if an appellate court reverses the holding
in Smelik, this case provides a strong example of one way plaintiffs' attorneys are
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precedential significance because the parties settled the matter
while the appeal was pending.' 44 And, as of the date of this
article, other published opinions have not rushed to cite Smelik.
Thus, the case has little wholesale value. That is not to diminish
on a retail level the good work plaintiffs' counsel did in the case,
securing a multimillion dollar verdict in a suit brought on behalf of
an insured in a wrongful death and survival action against an
ERISA-regulated HMO. Based on that alone, the case garnered
national attention, and rightly So. 1 4 5
From a plaintiff's lawyer's perspective, one must pay attention
to HMOs that care for ERISA beneficiaries.
[Dletailed standards of care [are] spelled out in multiple documents
including Member Handbooks, Physician Handbooks, Policies and
Procedures, Pharmacy Guidelines and many more. The non-
delegable duty of HMOs to be the ultimate guarantor of the quality
of care means that their failure to meet their own standards is strong
evidence of negligence in caring for patients, especially those with
multiple complex chronic diseases. To prevail in a wrongful death
case like Smelik, plaintiff attorneys must be prepared to fight the
discovery battles necessary to obtain the HMOs' own administrative
and informational materials and scrupulously avoid any mention of
denial of benefits. 146
attempting to circumvent ERISA preemption and endeavoring to hold HMOs
accountable in their management of health care.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
144. Humana Health Plans of Tex., Inc., v. Smelik, No. 04-05-00738-CV, 2006 WL
467987 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 1, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (granting joint motion to settle case).
145. See Linda P. McKenzie, Eligibility, Treatment, or Something In-Between?:
Plaintiffs Get Creative to Get Past ERISA Preemption, 23 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 272,272-74 (2007).
The [Smelik] case garnered national attention largely because of its unusual
outcome with respect to Humana.... The outcome of the Smelik case was significant
to the extent that it appeared to carve out this previously unrecognized exception to
the application of ERISA. For reasons not disclosed, however, Humana settled the
case with Joan Smelik's family while its appeal was pending. Because so many
managed care organizations employ medical case management, it will likely be only a
matter of time before another plaintiff claims that his or her HMO's failure to provide
these services caused damages. Perhaps a future case will result in an appellate
opinion addressing whether ERISA preemption applies in this circumstance.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
146. E-mail from Brant Mittler, M.D., J.D., to Bernard Reams, Professor of Law, St.
Mary's Univ. (Jan. 8, 2007, 07:46:00 CST) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal).
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As is typical in ERISA litigation, the Smelik action concerned
complex issues, multiple parties, competing regulatory and
economic interests, and, in this lawsuit, a family's tragic loss. The
lawyers involved were capable advocates who worked on the case
for four years before ultimately settling the matter. The page
limitations of the instant article preclude the effort to explore
every facet of the case, but hopefully, the authors have captured
the flavor of the proceedings that can be gleaned from the public
documents.
V. CONCLUSION
So what will happen in the ERISA arena next? It is of no small
significance that the Davila case was a unanimous decision. The
great legal minds from the highest court in the land, spanning the
spectrum of judicial philosophies, agree that in the pursuit of state
law remedies, ERISA today stands for all of the things plaintiffs'
counsel wish they could say are just not so. And even though
Justice Ginsburg, in her Davila concurrence, joined "the rising
judicial chorus urging that Congress and [the Supreme] Court
revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA
regime, ' only one other member of the Court, Justice Breyer,
went along for the ride. 14 8 Thus, there can be little optimism that
the Court will be the agent of change. Congress could more
efficiently expand the relief available under section 502(a) to
include monetary damage-if that is its will. But no such political
winds appear on the horizon. This article, then, ends where it
began, with ERISA still stuck in a Serbonian bog.
147. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J.,
concurring)).
148. Id.

